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Fourth Dimensional Intelligence
Thoughts on Espionage, Law, and Cyberspace

David M. Crane·
The enemy will be difforeut. ... No longer will it be the simple terrorist armed
with an AK-47 or the Semtex bomb . .. the new threat will be groups who will bond
in cyber space and attack using the new weapons £?f war: viruses, bugs, worms and
logic bombs. 1

T

he front cover ofa recent Armed ForcesJournal has an American soldier on
a rope bridge suspended over a chasm with the title "Ready for What?"2
This is a key question for national security policy makers regarding the mission
of US Armed Forces as the world moves into the uncharted waters of the new
millennium. 3
Institutionally, the national security structure of the United States is facing
many challenges. Configured to meet the Soviet threat, the Armed Forces, as
well as the intelligence community, are realizing that changes must be made. 4
The question posed above, however, is relevant regarding the issue of being
ready for the ne:xt threat. What are the threats that face our national security and
how should we be organized functionally to meet those challenges, particularly
as they relate to the dimension of cyberspace?
The geopolitical world of the 20th Century, drawn along colonial and ideological lines, is fading into the past. The threats faced by the United States today
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are not just standing industrial age arrni<:s, but international criminals, terrorists,
and State and non-State actors using relatively inexpensive and easily attained
technology to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. 5
Throughout history, man has waged warfare, conducted commerce, and
established an international political regime in a three-dimensional environment. Mankind has faced and conquered the land, the sea, and the air above,
moving freely about in these dimensions. Yet mankind has created another dimension which will shape its evolution well past the start of this millennium.
That dimension is cyberspace. It is in this dimension that both the legal and intelligence communities, among others, will have to develop an ability to
operate.
Among the practices ofStates, intelligence gathering is accepted as a necessity
in conducting foreign relations. 6 Throughout history, State actors have been
collecting information on the intentions, capabilities, and policies of both
friendly and rival States?
In the information age, intelligence plays an increasingly important role. 8 Information is the new strategic high ground. For the past fifty years or so the intelligence community of the United States focused on the Soviet Union and its
allies, mainly the Warsaw Pact countries.9 The mission was clear and the community organized itself accordingly to provide critical information to the National Command Authorities 1o on Soviet capabilities and intentions.!1 This
organizational model, however, may no longer be valid. 12
Due to the ever-increasing challenges in gathering that information against a
hard target, the community began to rely more and more on its technical capabilities. Imagery intelligence and signals intelligence provided spectacular coverage and monitoring of Soviet communications and critical strategic targets.13 At
times this was at the expense of the other intelligence collection methods such as
human-source intelligence (HUMINT).!4 In the asymmetric world of the 21st
Century, HUMINT and open source intelligence (OSINT) will playa key
role. 15 This role will not change in the dimension of cyberspace and computer
network attack or defense. 16 Additionally, the computer will become a useful
tool for an intelligence operative or analyst to use. 17
Throughout our history, however, the role of intelligence in defending our
nation has been misunderstood. 18 The methodologies of intelligence gathering
can, to some citizens, appear to run counter to the basic principles of a free and
open society.19 Though Americans are fascinated by the capabilities of the community, they have an unrealistic romantic view of the often dangerous and dirty
world of intelligence gathering. 2o
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The Role of Intelligence in the United States
Until the Second World War, US intelligence played a minor role in protecting our national security. Only during time of war did an intelligence service
emerge to support the commander in the field. After the emergency, the intelligence capabilities of the US diminished or were disbanded. 21
Counterintelligence played even less of a role and was largely nonexistent
prior to the First World War.22 Domestically, the counterintelligence service
became a profession in the 1920s with the advent of the Bureau ofInvestigation
in the Department ofJustice (later the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation) and the
creation of various service counterintelligence organizations. 23
The intelligence community has also had an awkward relationship with the
Congress. Until the mid-1970s, Congress deferred to the executive branch on
issues ofnational security as a constitutional prerogative ofthe President acting as
Commander-in-Chie£24 In the early 1970s, allegations of wrongdoing by the
intelligence community caused a public outcry and resulted in long-term congressional and presidential scrutiny.25 The result was the creation of the congressional intelligence oversight committees and presidential guidelines on the
proper conduct ofintelligence operations, particularly as they related to US persons. 26 Those policies and regulations are still in place and govern the intelligence activities discussed later in this chapter.
Thus, the US intelligence community truly was a creature of the Cold War
designed to operate in three dimensions. 27 It was created and designed to counter
Soviet hegemony, largely an industrial age threat. With the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, and the advent of the information age, the intelligence community, a large and cumbersome bureaucracy, has to evolve into a quick reacting,
forward thinking, and agile grouping of agencies ready to respond to various
asymmetric threats, including computer network attack. 28

The Challenges Ahead for US Intelligence and Cyberspace
The need for information by policy makers and warfighters will only increase.
The National Command Authorities and the geographic Commanders-in-ChiefS
will demand more real time intelligence for strategic and tactical planning.29
The present reactive stance of the community will have difficulty providing
current intelligence on the broad and diverse spectrum of transnational issues
and threats. This reactive stance is exacerbated by two problems. The first is the
organization of the community itself, the second, the management of the huge
amount of data generated by the various intelligence agencies. 3o Overlaid on
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these two problem areas is this fourth dimension ofcyberspace, the battleground
of the future. 31
Though the current legal paradigm ofinternational and domestic law regarding armed conflict was developed over the past few centuries, this evolved set of
legal principles allows, for the time being, a practitioner sufficient leeway upon
which to operate in the fourth dimension of cyberspace. 32
In short, the major hurdles regarding espionage and computer network attack
are not legal, but organizational and technical. Some of the legal challenges revolve around intelligence oversight and the collection of intelligence on US
persons, as well as the law of war. The intrusive nature of computers and the
Internet and their use as tools ofespionage, and even warfare, cause legal scholars
and practitioners in national security some concern, not from the lack of precedent, but of policy.

The Current Domestic Legal Framework
The current legal framework stems from statutory and regulatory guidance of
the late 1970s, due to the improprieties by the US intelligence community in
collecting information on US persons. 33 Centered on the National Security Act
of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, intelligence organizations in the United
States have been directed to follow certain prescribed procedures regarding the
conduct of intelligence activities. 34
The National Security Act of 1947, particularly Title V, gives authority
for various departments and intelligence agencies to conduct intelligence
gathering, laying out parameters as to what these organizations can or cannot
not do in the process. 35 One of the key statutory conditions is to keep the Congress currently and fully informed on all intelligence activities being conducted. 36
Executive Order 12333, signed by President Reagan, lays out the various
missions of the intelligence community and gives specific guidance on how to
conduct intelligence activities. 37 Each department promulgates and e:l>.1'ands on
this guidance through departmental regulations. 38 Additionally, there are internal policy directives that further refine the methods by which the intelligence
community can collect this intelligence. 39
These rules, coupled with international law, allow the intelligence agencies
to operate properly in cyberspace. If given the proper mission and authority,
intelligence organizations can collect information (conduct espionage) in this
fourth dimension. These operations can be done in peacetime, pre-hostilities
(intelligence preparation of the battlefield), and during armed conflict.
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The challenge is developing policy that allows the community to conduct espionage in cyberspace. Proper guidance is essential to ensure that sources and
methods are not compromised, the operational environment is secure, proper
counterintelligence concerns are addressed and monitored, and there is proper
oversight to ensure that the civil rights of US persons are not violated.

Some Policy Considerations
Operationally, cyberspace will pose the same challenges that a commander
would face in a three-dimensional battle. Concepts of speed, mass, maneuver,
surprise, taking the high ground, command and control, and forward support,
among others, all apply in cyberspace. The Commander will need to be able to
operate with as much familiarity and precision in this realm as he would on land,
sea, or air- integrating all four dimensions seamlessly in achieving full spectrum
dominance. He will also have to keep in mind, the four operational concepts espoused in the concept for future joint operations: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. 4o
Underlying all of the operational concepts listed above is the premise that new
and emerging technologies will give joint US forces information superiority in
any given mission. Information superiority is no longer a theory, but rather operational doctrine. Information superiority can be likened to the new high ground. A
force that gains information dominance in the battlespace can shape it by making it
not only more lethal for the adversary, but survivable for friendly forces.
A cornerstone in achieving this high ground is proper intelligence preparation of the battlespace itself using various methodologies, systems, and techniques to allow the commander to be dominant in his maneuver, precisely
engaging the enemy in whatever dimension, supported by agile, innovative, focused personnel and organizations. Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations, describes intelligence preparation of the battlespace as
" ... the continuous process used to develop a detailed knowledge of the adversary system use of information and information systems."41
The intelligence community's challenge is to determine how far it can go to
prepare that battlespace. Policy and operational concerns begin to surface as the
transition takes place from a third dimensional conflict to operations in the
fourth dimension of cyberspace. In attempting to understand the information
environment, the operator will need knowledge of, inter alia, the adversary's information systems; political, economic, social, and cultural makeup; decision
making process; geographic strengths and weaknesses; and biographical/psychological profiles. 42
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Methods to achieve proper intelligence preparation of the batdespace could
be intrusive, thereby butting up against privacy and oversight restrictions that
could hamper and even impede the gathering of this intelligence. Intelligence
oversight and review organizations will have to be aware of, and add \vithin their
training and review methodologies, information operations, to include principles of computer network attack and defense.
The potential for the inadvertent violation of civil rights of US persons is
great due to the intrusive capabilities of these tools. 43 It must be noted, however,
that these intrusive techniques have existed for many years and the oversight
rules are generally sufficient to ensure proper operational use. The term "least
intrusive means" is a standard in intelligence collection, similar to the proportionality concepts found in the law of armed conflict. 44
As intelligence organizations plan and execute operations to prepare the
batdespace, policy makers will have to determine how far the intelligence
operator can go to prepare for any situation along the conflict spectrum.
Misinterpretation by a potential adversary that this preparation could be indeed
an attack requires careful planning and oversight to ensure that there is no inadvertent response by an aggrieved party on our information or economic
infrastructure.

Concluding Thoughts • ••
It is not constructive to change for change's sake. Faced \vith new issues, the
law moves slowly, but in most instances the lapse of time allows for the controversy to ripen and be properly resolved. 45 In the past this could take years. In this
day and age, where a "web-year" ofthree months governs the business of the information market, the law could quickly become irrelevant and certainly a hindrance to both commerce and possibly our national security.
Practitioners must balance the need for a careful development of the law in
the area ofinformation operations with the fast-paced reality of the information
age. The intelligence community itself, like the legal profession, also must develop a strategic plan akin to the vision ofthe Department ofDefense in order to
move steadily forward in improving organizational structures and developing
more collaborative and streamlined information systems to support operations
in cyberspace.
Where all this will end up is anyone's guess. As in all things new, overreactive quick fixes will in the long run cause more confusion and potential harm
to this nation's security. Additionally, treating information operations as a "different" operational tool for a commander in the field is a mistake. The doctrinal
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and policy decisions by the Joint Staffto fully integrate information operations in
operational planning are certainly steps in the right direction.
Operators and the legal community must continue to work for careful change
domestically and provide leadership internationally to create appropriate rules in
which future operations in cyberspace may be conducted within proper legal
norms.
As former Secretary of Defense William Cohen declared:
If you can shut down our financial system, if you could shut down our
transportation system, if you could cause the collapse of our energy production
and distribution system just by typing on a computer and c!lusing those links to
this globalization to break down, then you're able to wage successful warfare and
we have to be able to defend against that. 46
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